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Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to Privacy and National Security
Surveillance
Francesca Bignami and Giorgio Resta
I. Introduction
In theory, the digital world represents one of the most likely terrains for the emergence of community
interests in international law. Because most aspects of human existence are now routinely digitalized
and sent across global communications networks, it has become increasingly difficult to pinpoint the
territorial location of human relations. For any single economic or social interaction that occurs over
the Internet, a number of states can generally claim a legitimate interest in regulating that interaction.
Thus the traditional organizing principle of the international legal order—territory—does not provide
significant traction over the digital world. At the same time, the thickness of transborder social
relations made possible by the digital revolution has created the promise of a global society in which
human solidarity is experienced without regard for national borders and a common understanding of
the rights and duties of citizenship in a global community can emerge. Individuals should come to
demand a common set of legal and moral guarantees that are enjoyed by all participants in the digital
world. In sum, the digital revolution has made community obligations both politically expedient and
morally possible: the old international system of states and territory cannot serve as an ordering
device for the borderless Internet, and the social interactions fostered by borderless digital
communications should give rise to a common set of moral commitments that will gradually replace
those of the nation-state.
Among the different interests at stake in the governance of the digital world, the right to privacy
is one of the most important. It is also one that has been explicitly recognized in international law as
a community interest. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”1 It is a fundamental right
enjoyed by all members of the human community and deserving of respect by all states whenever
they act on their territory or enjoy “effective control” over persons.2 Thus it appears that the promise
of a community interest in digital governance is matched by the letter of the international law, at least
with respect to the right to privacy.
This contribution explores the extent to which the state practice of digital privacy law lives up to
the promise of the universal right to privacy. It examines the law of what are generally recognized as
two of the most important jurisdictions for digital privacy: the United States and the European Union.
And it focuses on a policy area that has been the subject of intense public interest and debate in recent
times: national security surveillance by spy agencies.3 Protecting national security is a policy area
1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Since
Article 17 is central to this contribution, it is worthwhile reproducing it in full here:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
2

See discussion infra.
One of the challenges of understanding state practice in this area is that states have created different organizational
arrangements for the activity of protecting national security. We use the term “spy agency” to refer to any authority with
powers in the national security domain, even though that authority might also be a police agency, i.e., one charged with
prosecuting crimes, an immigration agency, i.e., one charged with controlling population movements, or a regulatory
3
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that can be considered a “least likely” case for the right to privacy, under national constitutional law
and, even more so, under international human rights law. In the national security arena, the state acts
to defend the population against low probability but high impact violence that threatens the very
existence and basic values of the national community. In this policy area, the imperatives of state
action are at their peak. Surveillance designed to advance national security is often allowed to curtail
substantially the right to privacy. This structural disadvantage is true of all privacy rights, including
those enjoyed by national citizens under their domestic constitutions, but it is especially pronounced
with regard to the international human right, since foreigners, who tend to be the most significant
beneficiaries of the right, are often among those believed to threaten the security of the national
community.
To summarize the exposition below: The safeguards afforded for privacy under the law of national
security surveillance in the United States and the European Union appear to be motivated as much, if
not more, by national self-interest as by a universal right to privacy. This is particularly true of the
United States. There the law has traditionally distinguished between insiders (citizens and permanent
residents) and outsiders (all others) and has protected the privacy rights of the insiders far more
assiduously than those of the outsiders. It has also distinguished between surveillance in the national
territory and surveillance abroad and has largely regulated only the former. As alluded to earlier, it
has become increasingly difficult to identify the location of, and territory of, communications in the
digital world. What is striking, however, is that many of the efforts that have been made to modernize
surveillance law rely on the category of person and seek to improve privacy for insiders rather than
relinquish that category in favor of an international human right that applies regardless of the identity
of the party. The exception is Presidential Policy Directive-28, adopted in 2013, which requires that
intelligence agencies recognize the privacy interests of all persons, but it remains unclear whether
this has altered the differences in treatment of insiders and outsiders.
In the European Union, there is no power to act internally (“competence”) in the national security
domain, including legislation and adjudication on the right to privacy in the activities of national spy
agencies. However, the European Union has certain powers to regulate privacy externally, in foreign
spy agencies, to the extent that such agencies receive personal data from EU market or police actors.
With respect to the United States, there are four bilateral agreements in place that touch on national
security surveillance and that seek to improve privacy rights for outsiders. Unsurprisingly, given the
bilateral nature of these agreements, they reflect the traditional, self-interested logic of international
law designed to further the interests of the parties to the agreement rather than the broader
international community. Although the EU-U.S. agreements have improved data privacy, they apply
only to personal data transferred from the EU and to data subjects located in the EU; indeed, in the
case of the agreement on police cooperation, certain rights are granted only to EU citizens.
Moving to surveillance by European spy agencies, the institution with the most comprehensive
jurisdiction is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Largely because it is a human rights
court, the ECtHR has taken a broader view of the territorial and personal scope of the right to privacy
than is evident in U.S. and EU law. Put differently, in the language of this project, the Court takes the
community interest in the right to privacy and the corresponding state duty to respect that community
obligation very seriously. Because privacy is considered a human right, all persons are covered and
are guaranteed the same treatment by the state. Moreover, like the UN Human Rights Committee, the
agency, i.e., one charged with regulating markets. For an analysis of the complex comparative law of police and spy
agencies, see Jacqueline Ross, The Emergence of Foreign Intelligence Investigations as Alternatives to the Criminal
Process: A View of American Counterterrorism Surveillance through German Lenses, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (Jacqueline E. Ross & Stephen C. Thaman, eds., 2016).
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ECtHR applies an effective control test to determine the spatial circumstances under which states
owe a duty to individuals and must abide by the community interest in human rights. Although the
ECtHR has yet to issue a definitive pronouncement on how the effective control test applies to state
surveillance, it appears likely that it will find that the test captures the surveillance of communications
with an extraterritorial dimension, e.g., communications that originate or terminate abroad or that
occur almost entirely abroad.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section explores the evolving content of the
right to privacy in international human rights law. The chapter then turns to the law of national
security surveillance in the United States, the European Union, and the European Convention of
Human Rights. The last section concludes.
II. International Human Rights Law and the Promise of Privacy as a Community Interest
Privacy is widely recognized as a fundamental human right. 4 In the context of digital
communications, however, the definition of the right is the subject of some dispute. At its core, the
right to privacy safeguards an area of autonomous development and liberty, a “private sphere” that
shall not be intruded upon by the unsolicited interventions of state actors or individuals and
corporations. Beyond this core, many legal systems also recognize a freestanding and more farreaching right to control the collection and use of one’s own personal information. Such an expansive
trend is clearly mirrored in the most recent regional human rights instruments, such as the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights.5 United Nations (UN) developments as well confirm the tendency to
anchor data protection in the context of international human rights law.6 Even though Article 12 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of the ICCPR have a traditional focus on
intimacy and autonomy, the right to data protection has recently emerged at the forefront of the UN’s
agenda. Both the UN General Assembly, in its 2013, 2014 and 2016 Resolutions on the Right to
privacy in the digital age, and the Human Rights Council, in its 2015 Resolution appointing a Special
Rapporteur on the right to privacy, directly or indirectly confirmed that Article 17 of the ICCPR is
implicated by the gathering and processing of personal data.7
The trigger for these international developments was Edward Snowden’s revelation of massive
electronic surveillance by the spy agencies of many Western states, most notably the U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA). Because these surveillance programs generally involve a significant foreign
component and because, as will be discussed below, U.S. law (as well as the law of many other
countries) tends to afford foreign nationals less protection than citizens,8 many activists, NGOs and
4

Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz & Melissa Castan, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 47677 (2nd ed., 2004).
5
Besides the right to privacy (art. 7), the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1
explicitly guarantees the right to data protection (art. 8). See Stefano Rodotà, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right,
in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION?, 77 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds.,, 2009).
6
See Kriangsak Kittichaisaree & Christopher Kuner, The Growing Importance of Data Protection in Public International
Law, EJIL:TALK (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-growing-importance-of-data-protection-in-publicinternational-law/.
7
G.A. Res. 68/167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Jan. 21, 2014); G.A. Res. 69/166, The Right to Privacy in
the Digital Age (Dec. 18, 2014); G.A. Res. 71/199, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Dec. 19, 2016); Human
Rights Concil Res. 28/16 (Mar. 24, 2015). In the pre-Snowden era, the Human Rights Committee stated, in its General
Comment no. 16, that “effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a person's
private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never
used for purposes incompatible with the Covenant.” (Int'l Human Rights Instrument, Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 21 ¶ 10 (July
29, 1994),
8
See Amit K. Chhabra, FISA Surveillance and Aliens, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 17 (2014).
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political actors have increasingly resorted to international human rights law as a possible shield
against abuses. Using international human rights law as a regulatory framework for national security
surveillance is undoubtedly a promising development from the overall perspective of this book.9 It is
not, however, an easy task, since the substantive content of an international right to privacy, as well
as the breadth and depth of the community obligations in this policy area, is a matter of dispute. On
the one hand, national security surveillance is generally regarded as a form of spying, and espionage
has traditionally been considered an activity at the margin of the law, a policy area in which the
imperatives of the state are at their peak. 10 On the other hand, technological developments have
strongly altered the physiognomy and contemporary significance of national security surveillance. It
is no longer targeted at government actors, but has turned into a massive “data machine,” which has
a wide-ranging and particularly serious impact on the private life of average citizens as well as on the
functioning of democracy.11 In the context of Article 17 of the ICCPR, two issues in particular have
given rise to debate: the scope of its application, namely its extraterritorial reach, and the appropriate
framework for balancing privacy and security. The remainder of this section considers each in turn.
The scope of ICCPR rights is governed by Article 2(1), under which the state parties “undertake
[…] to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.” It is uncontroversial that any interception of
communications taking place within national borders, involving either a state’s citizen or an
individual physically present in that state, satisfies the conditions of Article 2(1) and hence the right
to privacy under Article 17 applies.12 More complicated is the question of state obligation in the case
of surveillance that is not purely domestic. This may be surveillance of communications that take
place entirely beyond national borders, or surveillance of communications that cross states’ borders,
e.g., a telephone communication between a state national and a foreigner, or an electronic
communication between foreigners that is routed through the national communication infrastructure.
In either case, some or all of the individuals involved are not within the territory of the state and the
controversial issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights arises.13
On the extraterritoriality issue, Article 2(2) has been construed in different ways. The most
restrictive interpretation is the one asserted by the United States, on the basis of a literal and narrow
reading of the text.14 According to the United States, the ICCPR’s safeguards apply only to persons
who are both within the state’s territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Under such an
interpretation, communications involving individuals abroad, which are the focus of many NSA
programs, are not covered by the “international right to privacy.” The only binding restrictions would
be the ones deriving from U.S. domestic laws, as described in the next section. The U.S. position,
however, is the minority position, and has been criticized by other states, human rights experts, and
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See Eyal Benvenisti, Community Obligations in International Adjudication, in COMMUNITY INTERESTS ACROSS
INTERNATIONAL LAW XX (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte, 2017).
10
Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291, 313-314 (2015).
11
Zygmunt Bauman et al., After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance, 8 INT’L POL. SOC. 121 (2014).
12
Deeks, supra note 10, at 311.
13
For a taxonomy of various typologies of surveillance (foreign, transnational, domestic), see id. at 300; Marko
Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. J. INT. L. 81, 86, 121
(2015).
14
For an analysis (and critical assessment) of the traditional U.S. position, see Harold Hongju Koh (Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep't of State), Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf; see
also Beth Van Schaak, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations:
Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20 (2014).
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treaty bodies as fundamentally flawed.15 Indeed, the majority opinion asserts a broader interpretation
of Article 2 of the ICCPR, downplaying its literal wording, namely the use of the conjunctive “and,”
and holding that any state party must respect and ensure the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR both
within its territory and whenever it has “jurisdiction” over either foreign territory or a person.16 In
particular, the Human Rights Committee, in its case law and its General Comment, Number 31, has
firmly taken the position that “a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated
within the territory of the State Party.” 17 In international human rights courts and treaty bodies,
whether a state exercises “effective control” over a territory or a person today operates as the main
test for settling the threshold issue of jurisdiction.
How does the “effective control” test apply to the virtual world of electronic surveillance? This
test was originally developed with regard to physical infringements of human rights, as in the case of
torture or deprivation of liberty. On the basis of a narrow reading of the “effective control” test, some
scholars deny that the Covenant can be triggered by interferences of a purely incorporeal character,
such as electronic surveillance.18 In other words, if the victim of a violation is not in custody or subject
to other forms of physical control by the surveilling state, Article 17 is not implicated. This narrow
reading, however, leads to illogical results. The very same state action that would be prohibited “at
home” would be permitted if committed beyond the national borders, even though Article 17
establishes a universal right to privacy that should not turn on a purely factual criterion that is largely
divorced from normative evaluation of the interests at stake. Rather, it appears that the better approach
is to tailor the application of the effective control test to the specific character of the right at issue.19
It should not be forgotten that even the right to life might be violated without exercising effective
control over person or territory, as in the case of killings by drones. In the virtual world of digital
communications, conventional modes of exercising control such as police searches of physical
premises are rarely employed. Yet technology enables massive intrusions into the private sphere of
individuals, through, for instance, the bulk collection of electronic communications data. In view of
this reality, a teleological interpretation of the ICCPR appears preferable and the “effective control”
test should be applied flexibly in order to cope with the challenges arising from technological
advances. Indeed, it can be argued that whenever a state collects personal data, it is indirectly
exercising control over those persons that generated the data; therefore it should abide by the rules
laid down in the ICCPR, in particular Article 17, irrespective of the modalities or place of the
collection or the nationality of the data subject.20

Ilina Georgieva, The Right to Privacy under Fire – Foreign Surveillance under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its
Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR, 31 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUROP. L. 104, 110 (2015).
16
Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2146 (2014); Deeks, supra note 10, at 307-08.
17
Human Rights Comm., General Comment no. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the
Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
18
See the post by Jennifer Daskal, Extraterritorial Surveillance Under the ICCPR…The Treaty Allows It!, JUST SECURITY
(Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/7966/extraterritorial-surveillance-iccpr-its-allowed/; John B. Bellinger III,
Testimony
Before
the
Privacy
&
Civil
Liberties
Oversight
Board
(Mar.
19,
2014),
http://www.pclob.gov/Library/20140319-Testimony-Bellinger.pdf; see also, generally, Jennifer Daskal, The UnTerritoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015).
19
See Milanovic, supra note 13, at 120; Manfred Nowak, Letter to the Editor, What Does Extraterritorial Application of
Human Rights Mean in Practice?, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/8087/letter-editormanfred-nowak-extraterritorial-application-human-rights-treaties-practice/.
20
In a similar vein, see Milanovic, supra note 13, at 120-30; Margulies, supra note 16, at 2150; Georgieva, supra note
15, at 113-14.
15
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To conclude this discussion, it should be noted that a number of human rights bodies have
confirmed the expansive interpretation of “effective control” in the area of electronic surveillance.
The Human Rights Committee, in its Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the
United States of America, urged that the United States take “all necessary measures to ensure that its
surveillance activities, both within and outside the United States, conform to its obligations under the
Covenant, including article 17” (emphasis added).21 In a similar vein, the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, in his Report The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, firmly took the position that
digital surveillance
may engage a State’s human rights obligations if that surveillance involves the State’s exercise of power
or effective control in relation to digital communications infrastructure, wherever found, for example,
through direct tapping or penetration of that infrastructure. Equally, where the State exercises regulatory
jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data, that State also would have obligations under
the Covenant.22

In particular, given the universal nature of the protected rights and the global reach of
surveillance techniques, no discrimination between citizens and foreigners should be admissible. This
point has been made very clearly and convincingly by the special UN Rapporteur on the right to
privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci. In his last report issued on February 24, 2017, he noted that

it is of utmost importance that states respect the right to privacy, which is based on human dignity, on a
global level. Surveillance activities, regardless of whether they are directed towards foreigners or citizens,
must only be carried out in compliance with fundamental human rights such as privacy. Any national laws
or international agreements disregarding this fact, must be considered outdated and incompatible with the
universal nature of privacy and fundamental rights in the digital age 23

We now move from the scope issue to the question of how Article 17 and the international right
to privacy apply in the domain of national security surveillance. The wording of Article 17 of the
ICCPR makes clear that privacy is only protected against “unlawful” and “arbitrary” interferences.
As stated by the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in its General Comment, Number 16, the
term “unlawful” implies that any interference can only take place “on the basis of law, which itself
must comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant.” 24 In addition, the law
authorizing the interference must be precise and well defined, specifying in detail “the precise
circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted.” 25 As regards arbitrariness, the
Committee made clear that the notion is “intended to guarantee that even interference provided for
by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should
be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”26 The principle of proportionality is
therefore implicated by the concept of “arbitrary interference”;27 as openly stated by the UNHRC,

21

Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the United States, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, at 10 (Apr. 23, 2014).
22
See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, ¶¶ 34-35, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
23
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60 (February 24, 2017).
24
Int'l Human Rights Instrument, supra note 7, ¶ 3.
25
Id. ¶ 4.
26
Id. ¶ 4.
27
Joseph, Schultz & M. Castan, supra note 4, at 483.
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“any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the
circumstances of any given case.”28
These privacy requirements apply in the policy area of national security surveillance too. 29 Any
surveillance program should comply with a certain set of procedural and substantive standards, on
which there is growing consensus among the various international and regional human rights bodies
and courts that have been called upon to assess national practices.30 As recently summarized by the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in his Report The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,
any surveillance measure must be carried out on the basis of a law, having the following features: (a)
it is publicly accessible; (b) it contains provisions that ensure that the collection and processing of
data pursue legitimate aims (the protection of national security surely counts among such legitimate
aims); (c) it is sufficiently precise, specifying in detail circumstances, modalities and limits of such
interference, so as to enable the potential victims to reasonably foresee the consequences of their
conduct; (d) it provides for effective safeguards against abuse.31 As further stated by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, interferences with the right to privacy are compatible with the
ICCPR only insofar as they are necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and can
never be applied “in a manner that would impair the essence of a Covenant right.”32
Whether, based on this framework, the surveillance programs disclosed by Edward Snowden are
compatible with the ICCPR has been the subject of heated debate.33 Both the UN General Assembly,
in its Resolutions 69/166 and 71/199,34 and the UN Human Rights Committee, in its Concluding
observations on the fourth periodic report of the USA, 35 openly challenged the legality of such
measures as being in conflict with Article 17 of the ICCPR. It remains to be seen to what extent these
findings by international human rights bodies will actually influence the behavior of states, which
consider themselves at the forefront of the war on terrorism and increasingly rely on big-data
collection and predictive analytics to counter threats to their national security. 36 As will be explored
below, in the case of the United States and the NSA, such influence has been rather limited until now.
Improvements for the privacy rights of foreign nationals located outside the territory of the United
States have been introduced in large part as a result of the self-interest logic of bilateral negotiations
rather than in furtherance of the idea of a community interest in privacy.

28

Int'l Human Rights Instrument, supra note 7, ¶ 8.3.
Res. 69/166,supra note 7.
30
The European Court of Human Rights, which is considered by many to be a veritable forerunner in this policy area, is
analyzed at the end of this chapter. On the convergence between the UNHRC approach and the ECtHR case law on secret
surveillance, see Milanovic, supra note 10, at 133.
31
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age supra note 22, ¶ 28.
32
Human Rights Comm., supra note 17, ¶ 6.
33
The scholarly work that has dealt with this question has come to different conclusions. Peter Margulies is of the opinion
that most surveillance programs carried out by the NSA on non-U.S. persons outside the United States cannot be
considered “arbitrary” under Article 17 of the ICCPR, because they target “terrorists, national security threats, and
espionage in a tailored fashion” (Margulies, supra note 20, at 2153). To reach this conclusion, he reads Article 17 of the
ICCPR in tandem with the law of armed conflict and UN Security Council resolutions on counterterrorism, advancing a
“model of procedural pluralism that gives states flexibility in creating protections if they honor core principles such as
notice, oversight, and minimization.” Ilina Georgieva, by contrast, raises serious doubts about the legality of the mass
surveillance programs, arguing that the bulk collection of metadata and the indiscriminate interception of communications
– as implemented by the NSA and the GCHQ – constitute “a disproportionate restriction of the privacy rights under Art.
8 ECHR and Art. 17 ICCPR” (Georgieva, supra note 20, at 124).
34
G.A. Res. 69/166 and G.A. Res. 71/199, supra note 7.
35
Human Rights Comm., supra note 21.
36
See generally Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2015).
29

7

III. The United States: The Limits on Privacy Protection for Non-U.S. Persons
How does U.S. law on national security surveillance measure up to the community interest set down
in Article 17 of the ICCPR? As evident from the previous section, there are two somewhat distinct
issues, namely the territorial scope of the right to privacy and, once it is recognized that an individual
does enjoy the right to privacy, whether the state surveillance in question satisfies the framework for
balancing security and privacy. In light of the aims of this volume, this analysis of U.S. law focuses
on territorial scope, but it should be recognized that even in situations in which it is recognized that
Article 17 clearly applies, there remains the question of whether the right to privacy has been
adequately protected.
Under U.S. law, the right to privacy in the national security domain turns on both the place of the
surveillance and the territorial affiliation of the individual. The constitutional right to privacy is found
in the Fourth Amendment. Setting aside the debates on what kinds of surveillance practices are
covered,37 there are important territorial limitations on the application of the Fourth Amendment.38
The view has long been that, within the United States, the constitutional right to privacy in the Fourth
Amendment applies whenever the government conducts a search or seizure in the national territory,
regardless of the citizenship of the person.39 By contrast, when the government conducts searches
outside the territory of the United States, the Fourth Amendment applies only to that “class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with
this country to be considered part of that community.”40 Territory—the location of the data and police
access to that data—is critical for determining the scope of application of the right to privacy. 41 When
surveillance occurs within the United States, the assumption is that the person is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection, whereas outside the United States the reverse is the case.
Moving from police activity to national security, the reach of the Fourth Amendment is even more
limited. Under constitutional law, repressive state activity is divided into three categories: ordinary
criminal investigations, domestic intelligence operations, and foreign intelligence investigations.42
These distinctions were first drawn in the Keith case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1972.43 In that
case, the government had engaged in warrantless wiretapping of a member of a radical domestic
group (the “White Panthers”) who was eventually prosecuted for bombing a CIA recruitment office.44
When faced with the issue of whether the warrantless wiretapping was in line with the constitutional
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a difference
between surveillance connected to “ordinary crime” and to “national security.” 45 The latter was
conducted pursuant to the President’s constitutional power to “preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States” and was designed to “protect our Government against those who
37

There is no general right to data protection in the U.S. Constitution and therefore many new technologies and data
collection practices are not automatically covered by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has moved only slowly
to provide guidance on what types of new data collection practices, such as government access to private search engine
data and cell phone location tracking, are covered by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2014).
38
See generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN
AMERICAN LAW 157-86 (2009).
39
Daskal, supra note 18, at 336-37.
40
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). For a reading of the case law that is more favorable to
nonresident aliens, see Alec Walen, Fourth Amendment Rights for Nonresident Aliens, 16 GERMAN L.J. 1131 (2015).
41
See generally Daskal, supra note 18.
42
Ross, supra note 3 at 3.
43
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
44
Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith):The Surveillance Power, in
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would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.”46 In the Court’s analysis, national security could
be further divided into two parts: the “domestic aspects of national security,” which applied to the
defendant, who was involved in purely domestic radicalism, and the “activities of foreign powers or
their agents,” inside or outside the United States.47 The Court found that in the case of domestic
security surveillance, the government was required to follow the warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. In so holding, it was driven by the danger that unchecked government surveillance
would burden democratic debate and dissent. The Court, however, expressly left open the different
question of whether the warrant requirement applied in the case of surveillance of foreign powers or
agents of foreign powers, which quite obviously were not beneficiaries of the democratic freedoms
of the U.S. Constitution. This exception to the warrant requirement for national security surveillance
with a foreign dimension could apply to any individual, U.S. citizen or otherwise, since any individual
could serve as the agent of a foreign power. The Court’s scheme reflected the characteristic American
view of privacy, which emphasizes more the importance of privacy for the democratic process and
less the deontological, dignitarian value of privacy. It also drew a distinction that is unknown to the
international privacy law reviewed earlier in this chapter, one based not on the location of the
surveillance but on the purpose of the surveillance. In doing so, the Court left a constitutional
loophole in a situation in which, even under the most conservative approaches to international human
rights law, the United States is clearly bound by the right to privacy.48
As a result of the Keith case, state surveillance follows one of two paths and is governed by one
of two privacy standards. If the police conduct an ordinary criminal investigation or gather
intelligence on purely domestic groups, such as white supremacists, they are covered by the Fourth
Amendment as well as, in the case of the federal police, the extensive federal legislation that is
applicable to surveillance.49 If, however, the state conducts foreign intelligence surveillance then the
Supreme Court’s case law under the Fourth Amendment affords precious little guidance. Rather, spy
agencies are subject to legislation designed to fill the gap left by the constitutional law: the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),50 originally enacted by Congress in 1978, and Executive Order
12333, promulgated by President Reagan in 1981. 51 While FISA applies to national security
surveillance inside the United State, Executive Order 12333 regulates surveillance outside the United
States as well as other residual forms of surveillance. To understand the territorial and personal
limitations on the right to privacy, it is helpful to take each in turn.
Broadly speaking, FISA standards seek to ensure that government surveillance conducted
pursuant to FISA is truly directed at national security threats (as opposed to ordinary crime) and at
foreign threats (as opposed to domestic ones), thereby not circumventing the privacy protections of
the Fourth Amendment. Because of the importance of targeting threats that are foreign, as opposed
to domestic, in origin, the identity of the person under surveillance is pivotal in the FISA scheme.
46
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FISA creates the classes of “U.S. persons” (defined as citizens and permanent residents) and “nonU.S. persons” (defined as everyone else) and allows for more surveillance of “non-U.S. persons.”52
This was true as originally enacted but has become especially apparent since 9/11. Perhaps the most
vivid example is Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, enacted in 2008.53 It has been used as
the authority for PRISM, the National Security Agency (NSA) program that collects content and
metadata from a variety of Internet companies located in the United States, as well as for upstream
collection, the NSA program which intercepts personal data that transit through cables and switches
in the United States, and which gathers both Internet traffic and telephone calls, including the content
of those calls. 54 Section 702 allows the government to collect foreign intelligence information,
including all types of electronic surveillance, on any non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States when their communications cross U.S. soil. Foreign intelligence is
defined as information “related” to the protection of national security against foreign threats as well
as information that advances the foreign affairs and national defence interests of the United States.55
The government is required to follow targeting and minimization procedures approved by a special
court (the FISA Court), but these procedures mostly run to the benefit of U.S. persons: the targeting
procedures are designed to ensure that the selectors, e.g., email addresses, IP addresses, etc., used to
sweep up the data are indeed likely to produce data on non-U.S. persons abroad; the minimization
procedures are crafted so as to eliminate the data on U.S. persons inadvertently swept up in the Section
702 surveillance.56
Turning to Executive Order 12333, it sets down the organization and powers of the government
agencies that comprise the intelligence community and also regulates electronic surveillance. It
applies to the extent that such surveillance is not already regulated by the more precise and robust
guarantees of FISA and therefore is generally understood to apply mostly to surveillance conducted
outside the United States. The principal privacy guarantee is that the relevant agencies collect, retain,
and disseminate information only in accordance with procedures set down under departmental
guidelines and approved by the Attorney General.57 But this requirement applies only to “information
concerning U.S. persons.” Executive Order 12333 also contains other provisions on privacy, but they
are all worded so as to apply only to intelligence gathering conducted within the United States or
concerning U.S. persons. In sum, even more so than FISA, non-U.S. persons are entirely unprotected
under Executive Order 12333.
The digital revolution alluded to earlier in this contribution has prompted a number of actual and
proposed changes to the traditional legal framework for national security surveillance. To the extent
that these changes have been motivated by privacy (as opposed to national security) concerns, they
have been focused largely on improving privacy for U.S. persons. The FISA Amendments Act of
2008 contained three important provisions: Section 702, discussed above, and Sections 703 and 704.58
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These latter two transferred the surveillance of U.S. persons located abroad from Executive Order
12333 to FISA, considered to be more privacy protective. 59 At least part of the rationale was the
increasing volume of U.S.-person data located outside the United States, with the explosion of global
communications and the Internet, and the need to treat it under roughly the same rubric as squarely
domestic communications.
In contrast with Sections 703 and 704, Section 702 significantly loosened legal controls on
national security surveillance and has come under heavy fire from civil rights advocates. By far the
most critical was a report issued by the liberal think tank, the Brennan Center.60 It has called for the
repeal of Section 702.61 Yet even in the Brennan Center report, the case for eliminating Section 702
is based on the vast quantities of data on U.S. persons that are swept up in surveillance supposedly
directed exclusively at non-U.S. persons abroad.62 The government oversight body, the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board, has issued a far milder assessment of Section 702. Although it recommended
a couple of improvements designed to reduce the burden on U.S.-person privacy rights, it left Section
702 largely intact and deferred entirely the question of the rights of non-U.S. persons under
international human rights law to a possible future report.63 Last, a special presidential commission,
convened in the wake of the Snowden revelations, has recommended that Section 702 be curtailed,
but largely with respect to U.S. persons, not non-U.S. persons.64
There is one legal innovation, introduced in response to the Snowden revelations, aimed squarely
at non-U.S. persons: Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28). 65 PPD-28 mandates privacy
protections for non-U.S. persons in the domain of foreign intelligence surveillance.66 While avoiding
any specific reference to the international right to privacy, its language clearly invokes the discourse
of human rights:
Our signals intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and
respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate
privacy interests in the handling of their personal information. 67

The guarantees for non-U.S. persons contained in PPD-28 hew closely to a classic data protection
framework. It contains a general commitment to proportionality, 68 limits use, dissemination and
retention,69 addresses security and accuracy concerns,70 and provides for oversight.71 Although PPD28 is of considerable symbolic value, it is unclear whether it has made a significant change to agency
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practices. Academic opinion is divided.72 Commentators have voiced two types of reservations. Some
have argued that many of the guarantees announced in PPD-28 are already in place, including those
related to security, access, accuracy, and retention (for data held in mixed U.S. person and non-U.S.
person databases.73 In addition, Daniel Severson argues that the guarantees related to collection and
use in PPD-28 are not as robust as those in Executive Order 12333.74
IV. European Union: Improving Privacy for EU Data Subjects in U.S. Surveillance
There is a curious divide in the European law regulating national security surveillance. With respect
to surveillance by non-EU spy agencies, including the NSA, EU law controls. With respect to
surveillance by EU spy agencies, the European Convention on Human Rights (and the European
Court of Human Rights) controls. This chapter first considers EU law, which has expanded the rights
of EU data subjects subject to NSA surveillance. It then turns to the right to privacy under Article 8
of the ECHR and discusses the ECtHR’s liberal approach to the application of that right; as will be
discussed, states are bound to respect the right to privacy whenever they exercise virtual control over
individuals, including when they intercept the communications of individuals. .
In recognition of the uniquely transboundary character of personal data, most early privacy laws
contained an extraterritorial component designed to protect the privacy of personal data when it was
transferred abroad.75 Consistent with this approach, the first (and still operative) EU data protection
law also sought to regulate international data transfers. 76 Under Article 25 of the Directive, data
transfers are permitted only if the third county ensures an “adequate level” of data protection. If the
third country does not guarantee an adequate level of data protection, the transfer must be blocked or
one of the channels set down in the Directive must be followed. One such channel is diplomatic
negotiations that improve the level of data protection afforded by the law of the third country and that
result in a favorable adequacy assessment. Although, in line with the market-based origins of the
European Union, the Directive only covers data transfers by market actors, the adequacy assessment
extends to the entire law of the third country. Police, immigration, and spy agencies are increasingly
relying on the personal data generated in the private sector—including the private sector data
transferred from the European Union—for their surveillance activities and therefore the safeguards
applicable to these public actors have also become the subject of adequacy assessments. By contrast,
the European Union does not have competence, internally, over spy agencies because Member States
have retained their powers in this sensitive area of national sovereignty. 77 Thus the paradoxical
situation obtains whereby EU institutions are called upon to review and potentially regulate spy
agencies abroad, even though they do not exercise this same power over Member State spy agencies.
This extraterritorial dimension of EU law has generated three EU-U.S. agreements designed to
protect the privacy of EU data once transferred to the United States, including in the area of national
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security surveillance.78 These agreements have sought, in part, to remedy the lacunae in U.S. law
discussed earlier for non-U.S. persons. The first in the series involves the passenger name records
(PNR) collected by airlines and transferred to U.S. authorities for counterterrorism and crime-fighting
purposes. The PNR Agreement contains the full panoply of data protection guarantees required under
EU law.79 The terms of the PNR Agreement apply largely to the personal data transferred from the
European Union. To the extent that individuals are protected, in the provisions guaranteeing access
and correction rights and administrative and judicial redress, they are expressly protected irrespective
of their territorial affiliation: “any individual, regardless of nationality, country of origin, or place of
residence” has a right of access, correction, and redress.80
The second EU-U.S. agreement concerns financial data on bank transfers, gathered by the U.S.
Treasury Department under a program known as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). 81
Like the PNR Agreement, the TFTP Agreement contains a variety of data protection guarantees. Also
like the PNR Agreements, those guarantees apply to all the personal data transferred from the
European Union and, to the extent that individuals are directly concerned, to “any person,” 82 or, as
stated in the redress section, to “all persons regardless of nationality or country of residence.”83
Most recently, in July 2016, the European Union and the United States adopted the so-called
“Privacy Shield.”84 The Privacy Shield is designed to overcome the across-the-board, transatlantic
differences in privacy law and to allow market actors of all types to transfer EU data to the United
States without running afoul of EU law. It replaces the earlier Safe Harbor Agreement, from 2000,
which had a similar purpose.85 One of the most important novelties of the Privacy Shield is that it
pays considerable attention to the privacy guarantees in place when public authorities, including spy
agencies, obtain EU personal data from market actors. This is the direct result of Schrems v. Data
78
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Protection Commissioner, in which the European Court of Justice (CJEU) annulled the Safe Harbor
Agreement on the grounds that the European Union had allowed an open-ended exception to the data
protection principles “to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements”86 without assessing the adequacy of the applicable legal framework.87
The Court’s decision was based in large part on the massive transfer of personal data to the NSA,
including that of EU nationals, that had been revealed by Snowden and that is authorized under the
U.S. law discussed earlier in this chapter. The Privacy Shield, therefore, unlike the earlier Safe Harbor
Agreement, includes representations and commitments not just from the U.S. agencies responsible
for regulating the market (Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Department of Transportation), but also from the U.S. agencies responsible for national security and
law enforcement (the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice).
In the national security domain, the Privacy Shield contains two sections aimed at demonstrating
the adequacy of U.S. privacy law. The first is a letter from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), which provides an overview of U.S. law that curtails intelligence activities
related to non-U.S. persons. The letter is a response to the allegations made in the course of the
Schrems litigation of “mass and indiscriminant NSA surveillance”88 and the observation by the Court
that “in particular, legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis
to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 [of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights].” 89 In conducting this overview, ODNI pays special attention to the legal
guarantees for non-U.S. persons put into place by PPD-28, as well as the limits on bulk collection
generally speaking, set down in both PPD-28 and Section 702,90 The letter explains that whenever
Section 702 applies (that is, whenever electronic data is gathered in the United States on non-U.S.
persons overseas from Internet companies like Facebook), data is collected based on “the use of
individual selectors, such as email addresses or telephone numbers, which U.S. intelligence personnel
have determined are likely being used to communicate foreign intelligence information of the type
covered by the certification submitted to the court.”91 When surveillance is conducted under the more
general authority conferred by Executive Order 12333 and only PPD-28 applies, bulk collection is
conducted only when the use of specific selectors is not feasible.92
The second element of the Privacy Shield aimed at national security surveillance is a commitment
from the U.S. State Department establishing a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, located in the State
Department and independent from the Intelligence Community. 93 The Ombudsperson has
responsibility for the access and redress guarantees of data protection law. As outlined in the Privacy
Shield, to exercise their access and redress rights, EU data subjects must file a complaint with their
responsible data protection authority (DPA). That complaint is then sent to a central “EU individual
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complaint handling body” which transmits the complaint to the Ombudsperson. In response, the
Ombudsperson is charged with giving the following, two-part answer to the EU body:
(i) that the complaint has been properly investigated, and (ii) that the U.S. law, statutes, executives orders,
presidential directives, and agency policies, providing the limitations and safeguards described in the ODNI
letter, have been complied with, or, in the event of non-compliance, such non-compliance has been
remedied.94

Like the PNR and TFTP Agreements, the Privacy Shield is generally directed at protecting
personal data. Therefore, as long as the data has been transferred from the European Union, it is
covered, irrespective of the nationality or the residence of the data subject. The same is the case with
the access and redress procedures that are available to data subjects, with the exception of those that
require the individual to approach first their EU DPA before the matter will be taken up by the U.S.
authorities. In those cases, the individuals, as set out under EU law, must be data subjects “in the
Union.”95 The section of the Privacy Shield directed specifically at national security follows this
pattern. The review of U.S. law provided by the ODNI highlights the privacy rights of all non-U.S.
persons, not simply EU persons, following the terms of the U.S. law. By contrast, the Ombudsperson
provisions only apply to data subjects in the European Union, since they must initially approach their
EU DPAs before they are entitled to a reply from the Ombudsperson.
In view of the focus of this project, it is important to mention the last major EU-U.S. agreement
in this area, the Umbrella Agreement covering data transfers for law enforcement purposes. 96 After
over five years of negotiations, it has entered the final stages of the ratification process. The Umbrella
Agreement is designed to ensure a common standard of data protection in the area of police
cooperation, including national security investigations, which in the United States can involve both
police and spy agencies. In contrast to the EU-U.S. agreements already discussed, it is based on the
European Union’s competence in police and judicial cooperation. Compared to the other agreements,
the provisions governing the personal scope of privacy rights are more limited. As a general matter,
the Umbrella Agreement is drafted to apply to, and to protect, all “personal information” transferred
by EU authorities to U.S. authorities regardless of the origin of that information. 97 Moreover, all
individuals are entitled to seek access to their personal data, correction, and administrative redress.98
But two critical guarantees apply only to the citizens of the respective parties: the right to
nondiscrimination based on nationality99 and the right of judicial redress.100
To summarize the above discussion, the four bilateral agreements with ramifications for national
security surveillance contain obligations that apply to any personal data as long as it is transferred
from the European Union. In addition, they all contain rights that can be invoked by any individual
with respect to their EU personal data. The Privacy Shield, however, contains inter-institutional
mechanisms for obtaining redress that must be invoked by data subjects located in the European
Union. The Umbrella Agreement also restricts certain rights to EU (and U.S) nationals. Furthermore,
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all four agreements are bilateral agreements and therefore follow the bilateral logic of protecting only
data subjects with a connection to the European Union.
V. European Human Rights System: International Privacy Rights for European Spy
Agencies
Different from EU law, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) governs all the activities
of the Contracting Parties, including national security surveillance. Indeed, several decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deal with the secret surveillance of electronic
communications and its impact on the right to privacy under Article 8.101 Since the NSA revelations,
human rights activists and NGOs have filed three applications challenging the joint surveillance
conducted by the UK Government Communications Headquarter (GCHQ) and the U.S. NSA, known
as the TEMPORA program.102 Although, as of today, none of these cases have been decided, the
ECtHR’s case law gives a strong indication of how it will rule on these mass surveillance programs.
Following the same scheme used to analyze Article 17 of the ICCPR, it is helpful to discuss, first, the
scope of application and extraterritorial reach of the ECHR and, second, the privacy guarantees that
apply to national security surveillance.
The ECtHR has been a forerunner in the field of extraterritorial application of human rights, often
inspiring the behavior of other international human rights bodies and courts.103 Article 1 of the ECHR
lays down the state parties’ obligation to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” As an initial matter, it should be underscored that
the ECHR, as a veritable human rights instrument, does away with any notion of citizenship and
guarantees rights protection for “everyone.” Turning to the jurisdictional clause, it has been
interpreted liberally by the ECtHR. In a well-known series of judgments, the Court has recognized,
within certain limits, that the ECHR has extraterritorial effect.104 Although its case law has not always
been consistent, the Court has generally held that the state parties must abide by the Convention not
only when they act within their national borders, but also whenever they exercise effective control
over either a person or foreign territory.105
The effective control principle may very well render the Convention applicable not only in
situations of physical control over a foreign territory or person located overseas, such as in
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peacekeeping or state-building missions, but also in cases of “virtual” control, as in the interception
of communications taking place or originating outside of the country. For instance, in the 2008 case
of Liberty and others v. UK, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found a violation of two Irish NGOs’
right to privacy, neither of whom was physically present in the territory of the UK, because their
private communications had been monitored by the British government by way of its Electronic Test
Facility (ETF) at Capenhurst, Cheshire.106 The facts in Weber and Saravia v. Germany were similar.
There, the applicants claimed that their Article 8 rights had been violated by Germany since their
telephone communications from abroad had been intercepted by the German security agency. Both
of the applicants resided in Uruguay (and one was not a German national) and the German
government contested the Court’s jurisdiction, but the Court did not rule on the point, since the
application was declared inadmissible on other grounds.107 The Court will shortly have the chance to
finally settle the jurisdictional issue: in one of the pending mass surveillance cases, 10 Human Rights
Organisations v. UK, the majority of the applicants are based outside of Britain and claim to be
victims of a violation of their right to privacy as a result of the implementation of the TEMPORA
program by the UK GCHQ. 108 Recently, the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal held that “a
contracting state owes no obligation under Art. 8 to persons both of whom are situated outside its
territory in respect of electronic communications between them which pass through that state.”109 It
is by no means obvious, however, that the European Court will adopt the same stance and opt for a
narrow reading of the jurisdictional clause of Art. 1 of the ECHR in the context of electronic
communications. In light of the Court’s overall approach to the extraterritorial application of human
rights, it cannot be excluded that the ECHR will be held applicable to the electronic surveillance of
communications between individuals abroad, at least when, as in the British case, the state has
effective control over the digital communications infrastructure.
Having concluded the analysis of state jurisidiction, let us turn to the privacy (Article 8)
obligations imposed on surveilling states.110 At this point in the discussion, it is worthwhile flagging
the standing issue. The ECtHR has held on several occasions that, provided certain conditions are
satisfied, a person can claim to be the victim of an Article 8 violation by virtue of the mere existence
of legislation permitting secret surveillance.111 There is no need to allege that surveillance measures
were in fact applied to the complainant.112 This is important because in most surveillance cases one
of the biggest legal hurdles for the victim is the evidentiary one, since the measures taken by spy
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agencies are generally, by definition, secret.113 The significance of the ECtHR’s approach to standing
can be appreciated through comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that the mere
threat of surveillance does not establish standing to sue.114
As regards the privacy standards governing national security surveillance, the ECtHR employs a
framework similar to the one discussed earlier in the section on Article 17 of the ICCPR. Under
Article 8, interferences with the right to privacy must be set down in law, must further a legitimate
purpose, and must be limited by a number of substantive and procedural guarantees to ensure
proportionality. The ECtHR has consistently held that surveillance measures should be explicitly
authorized by a law, which must be accessible to the person concerned, sufficiently detailed as regards
the procedures and limits of the monitoring, and foreseeable as to its effects. 115 The “quality” of the
authorizing law is crucial in the Strasbourg court’s approach to secret surveillance, since an overbroad
definition of the scope of the monitoring would give the executive power unfettered discretion. The
ECtHR has also adhered to a fairly rigorous set of requirements under the proportionality analysis.
As early as 1978, in Klass and Others v. Germany, the Court observed that “[p]owers of secret
surveillance of citizens, characterising as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention
only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.”116
The ECtHR’s recent case law on secret surveillance has continued to apply a quite rigorous
approach, notwithstanding the challenges arising from global terrorism. 117 In Szabó and Vissy v.
Hungary, its first NSA-style surveillance case, the Court manifested serious concerns over the
technological advances that have enabled state authorities to collect enormous masses of personal
data and build detailed individual profiles. 118 It stated that the new threats to privacy are to be
subjected to even closer scrutiny and that the requirements of the existing case law on surveillance
are to be enhanced.119 In one particularly telling passage, the Court concluded that “it would defy the
purpose of government efforts to keep terrorism at bay, thus restoring citizens’ trust in their abilities
to maintain public security, if the terrorist threat were paradoxically substituted for by a perceived
threat of unfettered executive power intruding into citizens’ private spheres by virtue of uncontrolled
yet far-reaching surveillance techniques and prerogatives.”120
More specifically, in Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, the Court held that the phrase “strictly
necessary in a democratic society” (art. 8, par. 2) means not only (as in Klass) that secret surveillance
measures must be “strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions,” but also that they
must be “strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for the obtaining of vital intelligence in an
individual operation.”121 Surveillance, in other words, must be individualized. In this way the court
seems to rule out, in the absence of a previous judicial authorization, the blanket collection of content
and communications data referring to a wide range of persons and unrelated to a specific threat
previously identified. This finding is coherent not only with the firm position recently taken by the
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European Court of Justice with regard to the large-scale surveillance programs, but also with the
Strasbourg court’s longstanding case law on secret surveillance. While recognizing that states enjoy
a certain margin of appreciation in balancing privacy and national security and tailoring surveillance
programs to the particular aims to be accomplished, the Court has always stressed the need for the
states to put in place “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”122 The Court conducts its
assessment on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature, scope and duration of the possible
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorizing and supervising authorities, and
the kind of remedy provided by the national law. Among the minimum safeguards imposed by the
Court are, at the authorizing stage, the presence of an impartial and independent supervisory
authority, which in principle should be a judicial authority (but on this point the position of the Court
is not always consistent); and, once the surveillance has been terminated, the possibility of
challenging the legality of such measures retrospectively, in court.123 In both Szabó and Zakharov v.
Russia, a state surveillance case decided shortly beforehand, the ECtHR found that the respondent
states had failed to satisfy the authorization requirement: in Zakharov , because the Russian security
services were allowed to intercept telephone communications at their discretion and without a
previous judicial order; in Szabó, because the Hungarian Anti-Terrorism Task Force could monitor
all kinds of communications simply on the basis of a warrant of the Ministry of Justice, without
having to obtain judicial authorization and to provide evidence in support of their request.
VI. Conclusion
There are many hurdles to the establishment, in state practice, of community obligations. In the
domain of privacy and national security, as we have argued in this chapter, the United States does not
subscribe to a strong version of community obligations. By contrast, European countries, which are
subject to a powerful regional human rights court, are legally obliged to respect the privacy rights of
all individuals subject to state surveillance. To return to the overarching themes of this volume, one
reason for this difference is to be found in the different conceptualizations of privacy—including the
community interest in privacy—in the two places.
The U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally focused on rights, including privacy, as an instrument
for maintaining a healthy democracy. This is linked to the theory of rights announced in the famous
Carolene Products case: unlike the earlier, vilified Lochner-era case law, the Court stated that it
would vigorously protect only those rights specifically recognized in the constitutional text and those
rights essential to the democratic process.124 By contrast, European constitutional courts, including
the regional courts, safeguard a broader range of substantive rights and use the omnipresent
proportionality test to balance rights against the imperatives of state action.125 This contrast is what
one of us has called elsewhere the difference between the “ballot-box democracy” and the
“fundamental rights” models of judicial review.126
The comparative law consequences of the judicial philosophy announced in Carolene Products
are relatively well known in the area of economic and social rights. 127 What is less well understood
is how the Supreme Court’s reluctance to elaborate a robust core of fundamental rights has shaped
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the content and scope of classic liberal rights like privacy and, of particular relevance for this volume,
how those rights apply to the members of global society. The exclusion of political outsiders and
“foreign” threats from the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment is tied to the conceptualization of
privacy as primarily a safeguard against despotism and a vehicle for democracy. Democracy, virtually
everywhere, is practiced and conceived at the national or local level, not at the global level, and
therefore it is not unreasonable to suggest that outsiders should not benefit from the same treatment
as insiders when subject to state power. But, of course, in the realm of philosophical discourse and
the jurisprudence of other courts, including European constitutional courts and the European Court
of Human Rights, privacy is also protected because it is the sine qua non of liberal personhood.
Without privacy, it is impossible to conceive of individuals capable of freely choosing and pursuing
their own life projects;128 for this reason, privacy (and, in particular, information privacy) has been
defined as a precondition for the effective exercise of most fundamental freedoms.129 And in liberal
theory, personhood and individualism are to be enjoyed by all human beings; in this day and age, it
is difficult to devise good reasons for denying liberal rights and personhood, including privacy, to
those individuals who are situated on the outside, in different social and historical communities. A
flexible approach towards the extraterritorial application of privacy, such as the one that might be
deployed by the European Court of Human Rights, reflects this theory of fundamental rights.
The jurisprudential roots of state practice in this area suggest that the different attitudes towards
the community interest in privacy will persist for some time to come. Case law and courts are
notoriously resistant to change, as has been demonstrated by theories of path dependence. 130 At the
same time, there are a number of alternative routes, including legislation and special-purpose human
rights bodies, that exist domestically for safeguarding rights. In the case of the United States, these
can be enlisted to comply with any bilateral or multilateral international legal obligations that emerge
to govern national security surveillance. And in the case of Europe, the same alternatives to traditional
courts can be used to effectuate the legal principles that have been established by the European Court
of Human Rights, but that have often found little traction on the ground, in the law and practice of
domestic spy agencies.131
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